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Abstract 
We discuss the use of green nudges – nudges intended to reduce negative externalities – as an 
environmental policy instrument. A review of empirical studies reveals that green nudges can 
have a sizeable impact on behavior and the environment, but that the effects are context 
dependent. In the policy discussion, drawing on both the empirical overview and basic welfare-
economic models, it is emphasized that while green nudges seem to have a large potential, they 
offer no panacea for solving environmental problems. Instead, they should be seen as a policy 
instrument among others in the regulator’s toolbox. In particular, we discuss the potential role 
of nudging when environmental externalities can be dealt with using optimal Pigovian taxes, 
and when they cannot. Nudging has a greater potential when such taxes are not available or 
feasible.  
 
Key-words: nudge, environmental policy, behavior 
JEL codes: D90, H21, H23 
 
 
  
                                                          
* University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics, Box 640, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden; Telephone: + 46 
31 7864174; e-mail: fredrik.carlsson@economics.gu.se. 
 University of Copenhagen, Department of Economics, Øster Farimagsgade 5, 1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark; 
email: cag@econ.ku.dk 
 University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics, Box 640, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden; Telephone: + 46 
31 7862538; e-mail: olof.johansson@economics.gu.se. 
§ University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics, Box 640, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden; e-mail: 
verena.kurz@web.de. 
2 
 
Introduction 
Behavioral interventions, most prominently in the form of nudges, are rapidly entering the 
public policy toolkit. A nudge is generally interpreted as a change in any aspect of the choice 
architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options 
or significantly changing their economic incentives (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). Originally, the 
role of nudges was to counteract poor choices made by individuals, in areas such as personal 
savings and health. While such decisions can create negative externalities such as rising health 
care costs, the focus has been on improving the individual’s own welfare. If it is well designed, 
a nudge “[…] creates large benefits for those who make errors, while imposing little or no harm 
on those who are fully rational” (Camerer et al., 2003). Thus, such nudges constitute a 
behavioral solution to a behavioral problem.  
The concept of nudging has also found its way into environmental policy. Nudges are then 
utilized to influence people’s behavior, through changes in the choice architecture, in order to 
reduce negative externalities. Nudging in this context can then be seen as a behavioral solution 
to a traditional economic problem.  
To distinguish between a nudge that improves the welfare of the individual herself versus a 
nudge that aims to reduce a negative environmental externality, we will call the latter a green 
nudge. Thus, a green nudge is a change in any aspect of the choice architecture that is intended 
to alter people’s behavior in a predictable way and result in a reduction of a negative external 
effect without forbidding any options or significantly changing the economic incentives.  
This paper focuses on the role of green nudges as policy instruments. The next section 
introduces a simple classification of interventions and their underlying motivations, and then 
we give a review of empirical field studies concerning green nudges. In the subsequent section, 
we discuss green nudges as an environmental policy instrument. In particular, we discuss when 
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green nudges can and should be used as substitutes and complements, respectively, to standard 
policy instruments such as a Pigovian tax.  
 
A Simple Classification of Interventions and Their Motivations 
Inspired by the classification of policy instruments by Loewenstein and Chater (2017), we 
classify public policy interventions by type and rationale; see Figure 1. Cell A includes 
traditional polices used to reduce externalities or asymmetric information, including a standard 
Pigovian tax or information disclosure. Cell B includes traditional policy instruments that have 
been adjusted to account for behavioral biases such as inattention. For example, in the case of 
a tax, an externality with a marginal damage of 1 dollar should be taxed by more than a dollar 
if people are inattentive to the tax (Farhi and Gabaix, 2018). This category also includes 
traditional interventions that have a behavioral rationale, such as regulations targeting alcohol 
consumption or smoking. Inspired by the concept of externalities, the term internalities has 
been used to describe situations where people make decisions without fully taking the future 
(or other) consequences for themselves into account (Madrian, 2014). Such internalities can 
emerge for example if agents have self-control problems or are present-biased. Cell D reflects 
behavioral interventions that counteract internality and bounded rationality problems with an 
aim to benefit the individual making the decision. We call these nudges “self-focused” nudges 
in order to highlight the focus on the individual’s utility. In this paper, we focus on Cell C, 
green nudges. The rationale for such intervention is a traditional economic one, while the type 
of intervention is behavioral. A green nudge does not aim to correct a “mistake” in decision-
making but instead uses people’s biases and moral utility to nudge them away from creating 
negative externalities.  
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 Type of Intervention 
Rationale for Intervention Traditional Behavioral 
Traditional Economic (externalities, 
asymmetric information) 
A. Externality-correcting 
taxes, regulation, 
Information 
C. Green Nudge: 
Cognitive and moral 
Behavioral Economic (internalities, 
bounded rationality) 
B. Internality-correcting 
taxes, regulation, 
Information 
D. Self-focused 
Nudge: Cognitive and 
moral 
Figure 1. Overview of interventions 
Hence, the distinction between self-focused nudges and green nudges is not based on type 
of nudge, but rather on the rationale for nudging. While self-focused nudges focus on reducing 
internality problems, green nudges focus on reducing externality problems with behavioral 
tools. In many cases, externalities and internalities overlap such that a nudge can improve both 
the decision for the individual and society through a reduction in an externality.  
Moreover, we classify nudges – both self-focused and green ones – into two categories 
depending on how they affect the individual decision-making. We denote these two categories 
cognitive and moral nudges. 
 
Cognitive Nudges 
We begin by discussing self-focused cognitive nudges aimed to correct for bounded rationality, 
inattention or self-control problems, and thus to steer behavior mainly by making it easier to 
“do the right thing.” By “the right thing,” we mean, in a broad sense, acting in the individual’s 
long-run interest. Self-control problems can result in a divergence between people’s intentions 
and actions, such as dieters who are trying to lose weight but choose high-calorie foods when 
available (Wisdom, Downs, and Loewenstein, 2010). A present bias builds on the idea that for 
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most or even all people, the present carries a disproportionally higher weight than any point in 
time in the future. This overvaluing of immediate consumption and immediate costs compared 
with their long-term benefits can lead to suboptimal investments in health or pension savings 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004).  
In addition, individuals might make sub-optimal decisions for themselves if they base their 
decisions on mental shortcuts or heuristics. Kahneman (2003) describes the cognitive 
foundations of heuristics that systematically influence decisions, such as the accessibility of 
mental contents, the salience of attributes, reference points, and decision frames. Using decision 
heuristics leads to a context dependency of choices that would not be observed if agents simply 
solved a utility maximization problem without cognitive or other limitations. 
A cognitive self-focused nudge could, for example, be to put healthy foods at the top of a 
restaurant menu to make them easier to see, or to enroll employees in an employer-matched 
savings plan by default. These nudges work by making the option that is preferred by the choice 
architect easier and more salient to the decision maker. Often, as in the case of a default or any 
given restaurant menu as pointed out by Thaler and Sunstein (2009), it is actually impossible 
not to nudge. Menus first present either the healthy or the unhealthy options, and the decision 
makers will be influenced either way. 
A cognitive green nudge works in the same way as a cognitive self-focused one, but the 
motivation for the nudge does not require that the individuals are making a poor choice for 
themselves because of bounded rationality, inattention, or self-control problems. For example, 
an individual could make a perfectly rational choice concerning her own welfare by not electing 
a green electricity tariff. Yet, for a cognitive green nudge to work as intended, individuals must 
have cognitive or self-control limitations. For example, bounded rationality or self-control 
could lead an individual defaulted into a green tariff to stick with the new socially desirable 
default.  
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So rather than correcting for a cognitive limitation, a cognitive green nudge makes use of 
cognitive limitations to encourage socially desirable behavior that may or may not be in the 
individual’s best self-interest.  
 
Moral Nudges 
A moral nudge draws on people’s social preferences, their desire for status, to follow norms or 
to have a positive self-image. The nudge rewards “doing the right thing” by providing the 
individual with moral (dis)utility. Moral nudges do not rely on bounded rationality or 
inattention; instead, they work through direct effects on utility. Many of the empirical studies 
on moral nudges come from the environmental domain, but there are also studies where moral 
nudges have been used to increase savings (Beshears et al., 2015), enhance tax compliance 
(Hallsworth et al., 2017), and increase charitable giving (Shang and Croson, 2009). Comparing 
the decision maker favorably with their neighbor in terms of electricity consumption or 
highlighting the status that comes with driving an environmentally friendly car are examples of 
creating moral utility to increase a socially desirable behavior.  
 
Green Nudges – A Review of Empirical Field Studies 
In this section, we review the empirical field studies of green nudges, and discuss their empirical 
support and why they could affect behavior. We only present field experiments that measure 
behavioral outcomes and exclude studies with self-reported or hypothetical outcomes and 
studies with a small sample size. Table 1 presents published studies of green nudges that we 
review and summarize based on type of nudge and environmental problem. In the text, we also 
refer to a number of still unpublished studies. 
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Table 1. Green nudge field studies published in peer-reviewed international journals 
Study Description Target good Effect size 
Statistically 
sign. effect? 
Default 
Arana & Leon Opt in vs. opt out Carbon offsetting of air travel +27% Yes 
Brown et al. Default Default temperature on thermostat -1,8% Yes 
Ebeling & Lotz Opt in vs. with opt out Green energy contract +860% Yes 
Egbark & Ekström Default Paper use -14% Yes 
Löfgren et al. Opt in/opt out/active choice Carbon offsetting of air travel -16% (opt in) -7.7% (opt out) No 
Toft et al. Opt in vs. opt out Purchase of steering unit with heat pump -10% (opt in) -23% (opt out) Yes 
Simplification of information and salience 
Kurz Order on menu and presentation Vegetarian food +45% Yes 
Tiefenbeck et al. Feedback in a salient way Electricity consumption -22% Yes 
Changes in physical environment 
Kallbekken & Saelen Change plate size Food waste -21% Yes 
Reminders 
Gillbert & Zivin Reminder Electricity consumption -0.89% Yes 
Wallander et al. Reminder Sign-up conservation program +2.9% Yes 
Social comparison 
Allcott Comparison Electricity consumption -2.72% Yes 
Asensio & Delmas Comparison + framing Electricity consumption 
+3.8% (private framing)  
-8.2% (social framing) 
Mixed 
Ayres et al. Comparison Electricity consumption -2% Yes 
Bernedo et al. Comparison, long run Water use -0.89% No 
Brent et al. Comparison Water use -1%  – -5% Mixed 
Costa & Kahn Comparison Electricity consumption -2.1% Yes 
Delmas & Lessem Comparison; private and public Electricity consumption -5.6% (private) -19.2% (public) Yes 
Ferraro & Price Comparison; strong and weak Water use -2.8% (weak) -4.6% (strong) Yes 
Ferraro et al. Comparison, long run Water use -0.16% (weak) –0.96% (strong) Yes if strong 
Jaime & Carlsson Comparison Water use -5.4% Yes 
Mizobuchi & Takeuchi Comparison; financial reward Electricity consumption -6.8% Yes 
Richter et al. Comparison; varying reference group Share of sustainability-labeled seafood 
+6% – +21% (small) 
+8% – +18% (large) 
Mixed 
Sparkman & Walton Dynamic and static norms Meatless lunch +42% (dynamic) +36% (static) Mixed 
Sudarshan Comparison Electricity consumption -5.6% Yes 
     
Pellerano et al. Comparison, financial reward Electricity consumption -0.6% – -1.1% Yes if no reward 
8 
 
Schultz et al. Social comparison Electricity consumption 
+ 8% (descriptive, short run) 
-5.7% (injunctive, long run) 
+2.3% (descriptive, long run) 
-8.3% (injunctive, long run) 
Mixed 
Normative appeal and peer pressure 
Ito et al. Normative appeal Electricity consumption 
-0.03% (short run)  
+0.01% (long run) 
Only short run 
Goldstein et al. Normative appeal Towel reuse rate +26% Yes 
Kalbekken et al. Normative appeal Food waste -28% Yes 
Egbark & Ekström Normative appeal Paper use -2.6% No 
Schultz et al. Plea Recycled waste 0% No 
Yoeli et al. Observability Sign-up energy conservation program 80% – 200%  Yes 
Commitment and goal Setting 
Baca-Motes et al. Commitment Using towel additional days +3.5% (general), +28% (specific) Mixed 
Bryce et al. Commitment Number of weeks household recycled waste +13% Yes 
Harding & Hsiaw Goal Electricity consumption -0.04% Yes 
Jaeger & Schultz Commitment + social norms Water use 
-3.5% (social norm, short run) 
-5.6% (warning, short run) 
-8% (social norm, long run) 
-3% (warning, long run) 
Mixed 
Loock et al. Goal Electricity consumption -2.3% Yes 
Terrier & Marfaing Commitment + appeal 
Towels replaced in hotel room -19.5% (commitment) 
-20.5% (commitment + appeal) 
Yes 
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The by far most common type of green nudge that has been investigated in a peer-reviewed 
journal is some sort of moral nudge, and in particular moral nudges where the individual 
behavior is compared with a reference group. Most of the studies focus on the area of electricity 
and water consumption, and most reductions recorded range from 1 to 5 percent.  Default 
nudges constitute the second most common type of nudge analyzed in the literature, and most 
of the published studies find statistically significant effects of them. However, due to 
publication bias, the effectiveness might be overstated and should be interpreted with caution.  
 
Cognitive Green Nudges 
We classify defaults, simplification of information and salience, and changes to the physical 
environment as cognitive nudges. We also include reminders here, even though they are a 
hybrid between cognitive and moral nudges.  
 
Defaults 
The default effect refers to the tendency of people to stick with an alternative already chosen by 
someone else, even when the cost of making an active choice is very small (Johnson and 
Goldstein, 2003). The perhaps most well-known example of a prosocial default nudge is the 
one of organ donors, where the fraction of people who are willing to donate their organs is 
substantially higher in countries where people are organ donors by default (Johnson and 
Goldstein, 2003). Sunstein and Reisch (2013) identify three principal factors why defaults can 
influence behavior. First, people may interpret the default as a suggestion from someone – an 
expert or a policymaker – who has additional information justifying the recommended option. 
Thus, setting a default can lower the decision costs for some individuals. Second, people may 
put off deciding altogether, and then providing a default choice may result in them moving from 
10 
 
no decision at all to the pre-set decision. Finally, loss aversion or status quo bias can contribute 
to a default effect, as many individuals will evaluate available options in comparison with the 
default  
A few studies look at default effects and environmentally friendly behavior. Egebark and 
Ekström (2016) found a default effect on computer printing behavior: by changing the default 
printer setting from simplex to duplex, the consumption of printer paper dropped by around 15 
percent, and there were no indications that the effect was any smaller 28 weeks after the change 
had been introduced. Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) illustrate with two examples that many 
German electricity consumers stick with an environmentally friendly default option. Ebeling 
and Lotz (2015) compared customer choice of green energy between an opt-in and an opt-out 
case. In the opt-in treatment group, 0.6 percent purchased a green contract, while in the opt-out 
group the figure was 5.6 percent. In Brown et al. (2013), the default temperature on thermostats 
was changed from the standard 20 °C to a lower default. While a 1-degree decrease resulted in 
a lower average temperature initially, the effect disappeared and went into the opposite direction 
after a few weeks. What this suggests is that a default will only have an impact if it is close to 
people’s actual preferences. Johnson and Goldstein (2003) suggest that strong preferences for 
a certain option will determine the effectiveness of a default option. That is, individuals with 
strong preferences for another option than the default will be more likely to override it. 
However, there is little empirical evidence supporting this claim, partly because underlying 
attitudes and preferences are hard to measure. Vetter and Kutzner (2016) did not find any 
interaction effect between environmental attitudes and a green default in a survey-based online 
experiment. Löfgren et al. (2012) conducted a field experiment with experienced users in the 
domain of carbon offsetting and found no difference in the choice to offset emissions from 
flying between a default to compensate, a default not to compensate, and an active choice 
setting. They concluded that experience attenuates default effects.  
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Simplification of Information and Salience 
If decision makers are inattentive to some factors of a decision problem, they will come to a 
different solution than predicted by conventional economic utility maximization with full 
information. Chetty, Friedman, and Kroft (2009) found that shoppers pay only limited attention 
to a sales tax compared to the price before tax. Similarly, Allcott (2011) and Allcott and 
Taubinsky (2015) found that consumers pay little attention to fuel and electricity costs 
compared with the sales prices they face when buying cars or lightbulbs. This does not have to 
be irrational in a broader sense; it would be a rational strategy to limit costs of information 
acquisition and decision to cope with the multitude of decisions individuals have to make in 
everyday life (see, e.g., Caplin and Dean, 2015).  
The design of different types of consumer product labels is a primary example of 
simplification of information. In Kallbekken et al. (2013), electrical retail stores provided 
information on lifetime energy costs of appliances through a label and training of staff. A 
strong, but primarily initial, effect was found for only one type of appliance, namely dryers, for 
which the provision of a label and staff training led to a 4.9 percent reducing in energy use for 
sold units.  Other studies have also found mixed results. Stadelmann and Schubert (2018) found 
effects of both providing a label per se and of a visually augmented label containing monetary 
and lifetime-oriented information on the energy efficiency of dryers and vacuum cleaners sold, 
but not freezers. However, the primary purpose of a label is to provide better information in 
order to improve choices made, which is not a nudge per se. A label could still reduce problems 
of inattention, but it is difficult to know how large this effect is. 
The order in which information is presented can affect the salience of the information. In 
Kurz (2018), the salience of a vegetarian option was increased by changing the menu order and 
placing the dish at a place visible to customers. This resulted in an increase in the share of 
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vegetarian dishes sold by 6 percentage points. In Gravert and Kurz (2017), a similar effect was 
found by rearranging a menu in favor of a vegetarian option. Placing the vegetarian dish at the 
top of the menu reduced the share of meat dishes ordered from 50 percent to around 30 percent. 
In a study by Tiefenbeck et al. (2016), real-time feedback on energy use was given in the form 
of an animation of a polar bear standing on melting ice. The visual feedback reduced the average 
shower time by 22 percent.  
 
Changes in the Physical Environment 
The physical environment itself may be important if people have limited attention, or if the 
environment provides barriers to preferable behavior. The physical environment can also give 
clues on appropriate conduct.  
Kallbekken and Saelen (2013) evaluated a green nudge provided through the physical 
environment, with an aim to reduce food waste in buffet restaurants. In one treatment, the nudge 
consisted of providing plates that were almost 50 percent smaller than the standard ones. The 
effect on food waste was substantial, with a reduction of around 20 percent. 
Designs of the physical environment are often used for waste and recycling: designs of waste 
bins, and footsteps to the waste bin are some examples of nudge. There are, however, few 
academic and adequately statistically powered evaluations of such nudges.  
 
Reminders  
Reminders fall somewhere between cognitive and moral nudges. A reminder increases attention 
to a decision and reduces forgetfulness. However, reminders can also impose moral costs if 
they draw attention to a decision that the decision maker would rather avoid (Damgaard and 
Gravert, 2018). For example, being reminded can create guilt and/or cognitive dissonance. 
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Wallander, Ferraro, and Higgins (2017) investigated the effect of reminders on participation 
in voluntary land conservations programs and found that a reminder sent out to participants 
with expiring contracts increased participation rates. There was no additional effect of letters 
providing peer comparisons and social norms messaging. Gilbert and Zivin (2014) investigated 
the effect of receiving the electricity bill, which is a type of reminder, on hourly electricity 
consumption. They found a .6–1 percent reduction in electricity consumption following receipt 
of the bill, but that the effect varied considerably across households and seasons. 
Gosnell et al. (2017) sent reminders with personalized targets to airline pilots to encourage 
them to fly more fuel efficiently. In the subsequent eight months, the airline saved more than 
6.8 million kilograms of fuel mostly due to a Hawthorne effect of the monitoring. However, the 
individual target treatments added another 1–10 percent in fuel savings.  
 
Moral Green Nudges 
We now turn to the green nudges that make use of people’s social preferences and their desire 
for status, for a positive self-image and to adhere to social norms. First, we discuss green nudges 
relating to inter-personal motivations. These are comparisons between the decision maker and 
their peers, using both descriptive and injunctive norms. Then we present green nudges that 
make use of individuals’ intra-personal motivation. Theses nudges are based on the assumption 
that people wish to act in a consistent manner, and are related to pleas, commitment and goal 
setting.  
 
Social Comparisons and Social Preferences 
One important driver of human behavior is the desire for prestige, success relative to others, 
and esteem. There is extensive empirical evidence that people care about their status and 
relative consumption (Frank, 1985; Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; Johansson-Stenman, 
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Carlsson, and Daruvala, 2002). Sexton and Sexton (2014) use the term “conspicuous 
conservation” to describe consumption that signals pro-environmental action and generates 
green status.  
There can also be direct reasons for acting in a certain way that do not involve any direct 
comparison with what others do. For example, there could be altruism, about the environmental 
impact of one’s own consumption on others (Andreoni, 1990; Kotchen and Moore, 2008). 
In several studies, social information, i.e., information about other people’s behavior, has 
been provided with the intention to influence people’s decisions based on the idea that 
individuals tend to conform to the behavior of others. Cialdini (2003) suggests that the extent 
to which social information affects behavior depends not only on the actual information 
regarding what others do (i.e., descriptive messages) but also on whether it conveys approval 
of certain behavior (i.e., injunctive messages). Norms can be particularly powerful in unfamiliar 
situations where decision makers might look to others to receive cues on how to behave.  
A series of randomized field experiments aimed at water and energy conservation suggests 
that the provision of both descriptive and injunctive messages can affect individuals’ behavior 
by reducing water and electricity use (e.g., Allcott, 2011; Ferraro, Miranda, and Price, 2011; 
Ferraro and Price, 2013; Costa and Kahn, 2013; Ayres, Raseman, and Shih, 2013; Bernedo, 
Ferraro, and Price, 2014; Allcott and Rogers, 2014; Brent et al., 2015; Jaime and Carlsson, 
2018). A statistically significant effect on behavior is often found, although the size of the effect 
varies considerably. For example, Allcott (2011) found a 2 percent reduction in electricity use 
and Ferraro and Price (2013) found a 3–5 percent decrease in water use. The majority of the 
studies in this area were conducted in the U.S. A large study carried out in Germany suggests 
that the effects on behavior of norm messages are almost non-existent there (Andor et al., 2017). 
Similar effects as in the US studies were found only for high energy-use households. The main 
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explanation by Andor et al. (2017) for the absence of an average effect is that there is simply 
less room for a reduction if the initial energy use level is already quite low. 
There are also interesting developments in the exploration of how social information is 
communicated. One example is the study by Delmas and Lessem (2014), who studied the effect 
of both private information to the household and public information to all neighbors on 
electricity use. They found that only a combination of private and public information had an 
effect on energy use (a 20 percent reduction). Sparkman and Walton (2017) investigated the 
role of dynamic norms (information on how other people’s behavior changes) and found a 
stronger effect of dynamic norms than of standard static norm. 
 
Moral Pleas 
Some types of nudges are linked to social preferences but do not directly involve social 
comparisons (e.g., Schultz, 1999; Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius, 2008). In Ito, Ida, and 
Tanaka (2018), moral suasion was used to reduce energy use during peak hours. The following 
message was received by some households: “Substantial energy conservation will be required 
for the society during critical peak-demand hours in summer and winter.” This was compared 
with a control group and a group that received economic incentives to reduce energy use. 
Electricity use was reduced by around 8 percentage points in the moral suasion group and by 
around 15 percent by the households that received economic incentives. However, the effect of 
moral suasion diminished quickly when repeated, while the effect of the economic incentives 
did not. In Egebark and Ekström (2016), a moral message was provided in order to reduce the 
use of printer paper, but no effects were found. 
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Commitment and Goal Setting 
The nudges based on commitment and goal setting relate primarily to problems with self-
control, and with green nudges they are often based on the fact that individuals want to see 
themselves as “good people” (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Identity 
can be a driver of behavior if an action is important for one’s “sense of self” (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2000), and people gain utility by behaving in line with what they perceive as consistent 
with their self-image. In contrast, actions that conflict with moral values, beliefs, or convictions 
can cause cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), a feeling of mental discomfort. Concerning 
environmental actions, people who define themselves as “green” are likely to strive for 
consistency by avoiding environmentally unfriendly behavior.  
Harding and Hsiaw (2014) investigated how voluntary goal setting concerning electricity 
savings affects actual electricity use and found that those who set a realistic goal save more 
than those who set a too low or too high goal. Loock, Staake, and Thiesse (2013) looked at how 
goal setting affects energy savings and found that both individual and default goals lead to 
significant savings, but that default goals that deviate too much from self-set goals could be 
detrimental for energy savings. In Kormos, Gifford, and Brown (2015), goal-setting was 
combined with descriptive social norm information to influence private vehicle use. Goal-
setting alone had a small effect on private vehicle use, but when combined with a description 
of what other had done, the effect became considerably larger. 
Offering voluntary ways to commit is a stricter nudge than just setting goals. In Gine et al. 
(2010), smokers received a savings account offer. If they opted into the program, they had to 
deposit money into the account. After six months, they got their money back if they passed a 
urine test; otherwise, the money was given to charity. Eleven percent of the smokers accepted 
the offer. The rate of cessation was around 3–6 percentage points higher for those enrolled in 
the program than for a control group. In Baca-Motes et al. (2013), some hotel guests were given 
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the opportunity to commit to acting more sustainably and received a pin enabling them to signal 
commitment. Treated guests were more likely to reuse their towels than those who were not 
asked to commit. The effect of the commitment was stronger if they received a pin, and it was 
also stronger if the commitment was more specific (reuse towels) than general (act in an 
environmentally friendly way). 
 
Green Nudges and Conventional Policy Instruments 
The design of traditional instruments such as taxes and regulatory standards when consumers 
are inattentive or bounded rational behavioral limitations have been discussed in the literature 
to some extent (Tsvetanov and Segerson, 2013; Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky, 2014; 
Heutel, 2015; Farhi and Gabaix, 2018). For example, if individuals misperceive tax, then the 
optimal behavioral Pigovian tax should be adjusted in accordance with the extent of the 
misperception.  (Farhi and Gabaix, 2018). Think of a case where individuals misperceive the 
price of a good by a constant factor. The optimal tax would then be the marginal damage plus 
this misperception factor. Yet, as far as we know, almost no work (with the exception of 
Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2018) is based on optimal nudging in the presence of 
externalities, with or without other behavioral failures.  
The role of a green nudge as a policy instrument will critically depend on a number of factors. 
How does the nudge compare with a traditional policy instrument in feasibility and 
implementation costs? How does it compare to other policies in its effectiveness in reducing 
the externality? What other policies can be implemented? What are the implementation costs 
of the nudge? 
Very few direct comparisons of the effectiveness of green nudges with that of traditional 
policy instruments have been made. Ito et al. (2018) compared effects on energy demand 
between moral suasion and economic incentives, and found that long-term economic incentives 
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worked better than moral suasion to reduce energy consumption. Benartzi et al. (2017) 
compared a social norm message Allcott (2011) with discounts of the electricity bill in Ito 
(2015) and found that for the nudge 27.3 kWh was saved per dollar spent on the intervention, 
while for the discount the figure was only 3.41 kWh. Finally, Whittington and Nauges (2018) 
found that the net-benefits for society are likely to be higher for a price instrument than for a 
social-information nudge, but that price increases also imply that households would bear most 
of the costs.  
An important factor to consider is the cost of implementing and providing a nudge. Some 
nudges only require a minimal change in the choice architecture or a change in the framing of 
communication. The best example of this is perhaps default nudges, where either a default 
option is implemented or the existing default option is redesigned. Many other nudges require 
non-negligible fixed costs and/or variables costs. While one might think that such nudges are 
cheap, they often are not (Allcott and Kessler, 2017). Sending norm messages, or reminders, 
and giving feedback and measuring goals, etc. result in implementation costs. The extent of 
these costs depends on the type of nudge and whether it involves smaller adjustments of current 
systems (e.g., adding a small message to electricity bills) or more fundamental changes 
(estimating and then designing information about relative electricity consumption). If we 
compare the costs of a nudge to changing the level of an existing environmental tax, the 
administrative costs are in most cases larger for a nudge. Yet, if there is no existing tax or if it 
is difficult to implement a new tax, then a tax will also involve non-negligible costs, and these 
costs may sometimes be larger than the corresponding administrative costs for nudging.  
There are also potential differences between nudges and taxes in terms of enforcement costs. 
While one might initially think that the enforcement costs associated with nudges should be 
smaller than for other instruments, this is actually not at all clear. The implementation cost 
would be small or even non-existent to the extent that they would be implemented voluntarily 
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by private firms. Yet, if the government would need to ensure that private firms are actually 
implementing certain nudges, there is no reason to believe that the enforcement costs would be 
low.  
 
Optimal Cognitive Nudging 
We will primarily base our discussion here on the models in Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman 
(2018), who look at pro-social nudging, and to some extent on the more general models in Farhi 
and Gabaxi (2018). To begin with, consider a simple textbook model with identical individuals 
and two goods, one clean and one dirty, each of which generates a negative environmental 
externality. The objective of the government is to maximize the sum of utilities, which is here 
equivalent to obtaining a Pareto-efficient allocation since individuals are identical.  
 
With an Optimal Pigovian Tax 
Let us start with the conventional assumption that the externality can be perfectly targeted by a 
Pigovian tax, without any administrative costs. In such a world, it is easy to show that there is 
no role for green cognitive nudging, since the first-best optimum can be achieved with a 
Pigovian tax alone. Thus, the government sets a tax equal to the marginal damage, and a first-
best optimum is achieved.  
 
With no Other Regulation 
Consider next the extreme case where no taxes or any other conventional policy instrument can 
be used. Furthermore, suppose that a nudge can be used without costs and that it perfectly 
targets those individuals who are causing the externality. As we have discussed, there are many 
different cognitive nudges affecting individual behavior through different channels. In the 
literature, this has primarily been modeled in two different ways. The first is to let the nudge 
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affect the decision utility, which in turn will affect behavior. Here a difference between (ex 
ante) decision utility and (ex post) experienced utility is often explicitly modeled in order to 
allow for an internality (Gabaix and Farhi, 2018). The second is to let the nudge affect the 
perceived price of a good, which in turn will affect behavior (Gabaix and Farhi, 2018). An 
internality is then modeled as a misperception of prices. The two approaches are under most 
circumstances equivalent.  
We will here illustrate the role of a nudge in a model setting where it affects perceived prices. 
Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman (2018) model a conventional cognitive nudge as a nudge that 
increases the perceived relative price of a dirty good. Under this setting, the optimal level of a 
nudge implies that the perceived relative price is the same relative price that would be the result 
of a Pigovian tax.  
Let us illustrate with a numerical example. Suppose that without any regulation, the prices 
of both goods are 10 USD, and that the dirty good generates a constant marginal damage of 3 
USD per unit consumed. A first-best Pigovian tax is then 3 USD per unit consumed. An optimal 
nudge, in the absence of a tax, should then result in a perceived relative price of the dirty good 
of 13/10. The level of the nudge that would be needed depends on how effective the nudge is 
in affecting the perceived relative price. Gabaix and Farhi (2018) denote the malleability of the 
perception as the nudgeability. The larger the nudgeability, the lower the amount of the nudge 
needed.  
 
With a Non-Optimal Tax 
Suppose that a tax can be used but, for whatever reason, is too low. Let us assume that the tax 
is 2 USD per unit instead of the optimal of 3 USD. The optimal level of a cognitive nudge will 
still be one that results in a relative price of 13/10. However, since the tax is now internalizing 
a part of the externality, less of the nudge is needed to obtain the optimum, compared with a 
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situation with no taxes on the dirty good. How much to nudge would again depend on the 
nudgeability.  
 
Administrative Costs 
How do the optimal conditions change with administrative costs? With such costs there is a 
tradeoff between the social benefit of the nudge and the cost of providing it. If we assume that 
the effect of the nudge on the relative price is proportional to the level of the nudge, it can be 
shown that the optimal level of the nudge depends on the effect of the nudge on the marginal 
damage and the cost of changing the perceived relative price. (Carlsson and Johansson-
Stenman, 2018). This means that the optimal level of the nudge is decreasing in the level of the 
marginal cost of providing the nudge. Moreover, when we introduce administrative costs, a 
corner solution of zero nudging may be optimal also when the taxes are not optimal.  
 
Adding Internalities 
So far, we have assumed that there are no internalities. What happens if there are also some 
types of internalities involved? In Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman (2018), this is illustrated 
as a bias in the perceived price: individuals misperceive the true price of the dirty good. This 
misperception of the true price could stem for example from inattention. The optimal level of 
the nudge then also depends on the extent of this bias. The larger the bias, the stronger the nudge 
needs to be. Similarly, an optimal tax needs to be corrected in the same manner. Consider the 
same example as before and with no administrative costs. Both goods cost 10 USD and the 
marginal damage is 3 USD. Let us focus on a situation where the perceived price of the dirty 
good is lower than the actual price, for simplicity suppose it is 9 USD. An optimal nudge or an 
optimal tax would then have to change the relative price of the dirty good from 9 USD to 13 
USD, if we disregard administrative costs.   
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Optimal Moral Nudging 
With a moral nudge, we assume that the nudge directly affects people’s utility and that people 
care about their own perceived morality (in addition to the goods and environmental quality). 
Following again Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman (2018), we assume that perceived own 
morality is decreasing in consumption of the dirty good. The strength of the moral norm is 
influenced by the nudge as follows: the stricter the norm, the larger the importance of morality.  
Our line of reasoning is similar to that for cognitive nudges. Consider the case without 
administrative costs and with no possibility to tax the dirty good. An optimal nudge should lead 
to the same allocation of the clean and the dirty good as with an optimal Pigovian tax. However, 
with a moral nudge there could also be a direct utility effect from a strengthened moral norm. 
This effect could be positive, e.g., that people are proud if they manage to reduce the 
consumption of the dirty good. Allcott and Kessler (2017) denote such utility effects moral 
subsidies, and Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman (2018) call such nudges encouraging nudges. 
The effect could also be negative, e.g., that people feel bad because of their consumption of the 
dirty good. Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman denote such nudges discouraging nudges. As with 
cognitive nudges, we will discuss the role of moral nudges with and without optimal Pigovian 
taxes. Here we directly consider administrative costs.  
 
With an Optimal Pigovian tax 
Even when a Pigovian tax is feasible, it might be optimal to provide an encouraging moral 
nudge. The welfare effect of this nudge would then purely come from the direct hedonic effect 
of being moral on utility. The level of the nudge would depend on the marginal benefit in terms 
of increased moral utility and the marginal cost of providing it (Carlsson and Johansson-
Stenman, 2018). In contrast, with an optimal Pigovian tax it would never be optimal to 
implement a discouraging moral nudge.  
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With no Other Regulation 
Without any other regulation, there is more room for moral nudges and now discouraging moral 
nudges may be optimal. With a discouraging moral nudge, there is a trade-off between the 
reduction of the negative external effect vs. the direct negative effect on moral utility and the 
marginal cost of providing the nudge. With an encouraging nudge, there is a trade-off between 
the reduction of the negative external effect and the direct positive effect on utility vs. the 
marginal cost of providing the nudge. 
 
Optimal Nudges with Heterogeneous Individuals 
So far, we have based our welfare-theoretic reasoning on a simple model with identical 
individuals. We will here outline some additional roles of nudging that would arise in a world 
with heterogeneous individuals.  
 
Targeting 
With heterogeneous individuals, there are a number of cases where a nudge might be optimal 
even with an externality-correcting tax that is optimal on average but that cannot be 
differentiated perfectly to obtain the first-best allocation. Suppose that some individuals cause 
much larger externalities than others when consuming the exact same goods and services, but 
that the tax can only be differentiated at the goods level. For example, a gasoline tax cannot 
induce a first-best allocation since most externalities depend on where, when and how a car is 
used. Another example is non-point source pollution, where there is limited observability of 
individual emissions. Then if a nudge can target large externality creating individuals in a way 
the tax cannot, it can be welfare improving.  
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A nudge may also be preferred to a tax when there is heterogeneity in both misperceptions 
of prices (Farhi and Gabaix, 2018) and how individuals are affected by a nudge (Carlsson and 
Johansson-Stenman, 2018). Think of an extreme situation where half the population have no 
misperception of prices while the other half underestimate the price of the externality-
generating good. An optimal tax would then be adjusted upwards because of the 
underestimation of the price on average. Neither of the two groups would face a tax equal to 
the marginal damage. If those who underestimate the price are also more nudgeable, then a 
nudge might be preferred over a tax because it would better target individuals with a biased 
perception. It is plausible that those who are inattentive, inconsistent or irrational are also on 
average more easily affected by a nudge. 
Furthermore, a tax can be expected to a limited impact when it does not target the end users. 
For example, airline pilots normally do not have a direct incentive to avoid carbon taxes and 
hotel guests have no direct incentive to reduce food waste.  
 
Redistribution 
Both a nudge and a tax can have direct monetary distributional effects. The direct monetary 
effects are presumably larger for a tax. If we assume that the group of people who consume the 
dirty good is poorer, then a nudge to reduce consumption could be preferred over a tax even 
when the nudge is costly (cf. Farhi and Gabaix, 2018, p. 27). However, the government can of 
course deal with distributional issues by making changes in other policy instruments, such as 
income taxes, which must be accounted for in an analysis of distributional effects.   
  
Crowding Out 
A great deal of empirical evidence suggests that individuals have other motives than monetary 
self-interest, such as a direct concern for the environment or the well-being of others. This does 
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not constitute an argument per se against standard policy instruments. However, it raises the 
question about the interaction between the policy instrument and non-material motives 
(Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2012). There are arguments for why a policy based on 
economic incentives could either crowd in or crowd out other motivations, and the extent of 
these effects is often highly uncertain. If there are intrinsic motivations for acting pro-socially 
and these can be crowded out by standard environmental policy instruments, then there could 
be a role for nudging. One such case could be the use of moral subsidies, which we have already 
discussed. Another case where crowding out could have implication for the choice of policy 
instrument is if the crowding-out effect of a nudge is smaller than that of other instruments.  
There is little empirical evidence of spillover effects and crowding out by nudges in the field. 
Chetty et al. (2014) compare the effects of a subsidy and a default enrollment in a pension plan 
and find that the latter is more effective for a majority of inattentive savers, while the subsidy 
crowds out savings for the minority of savers who are attentive to it. Jaime and Carlsson (2018) 
find substantial spillover effects between households targeted by a social information campaign 
on water savings and untargeted households in the same city. 
 
Additional aspects concerning Nudges as Policy Instruments 
When it comes to the practical implementation of nudges as policy instruments, the following 
aspects must be considered: For traditional environmental regulations, it is clear who decides 
on the design and extent of the regulation. With green nudges as policy instruments, we partly 
enter a new world. Nudges could either be mandated or implemented by the government. In 
both cases though, the government needs to suggest which nudges to use and allow. In the UK, 
the Behavioral Insights Team is responsible for this as part of the government. Similar units 
have been created in the U.S. and Australia, and other countries, the World Bank, and the OECD 
are following suit.  
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One advantage of most nudges is that they can be tested for viability in a pilot study before 
being rolled out to the entire population. For example, the Danish fat tax was abolished after 15 
months due to avoidance behavior and the fact that no visible effects on saturated fat 
consumption were detected. Here a pilot study could have saved a lot of money and time 
(Bødker et al., 2016). However, in the case of taxes, the behavioral response mechanism is 
clear. Raised prices are supposed to reduce consumption. For nudges, there could be dozens of 
heuristics, biases, and behavioral motivations at play that could be addressed with several types 
of nudges.  
Finally, we want to highlight one important aspect in the traditional nudge literature, namely 
that of libertarian paternalism, i.e., the idea that the government should not interfere with the 
freedom to choose (Thaler and Suntein, 2009). When nudging is used as a way to correct for 
assumed internalities, the ethical discussion related to paternalism is clearly important (Sugden, 
2018). How much should the government interfere when people seem to be making mistakes? 
How do we know that they are making mistakes and are not acting according to their true 
preferences? Maybe people have the right to make their own mistakes regardless of their 
preferences? However, when it comes to green nudges, the fundamental reason is to correct for 
an externality and some of the paternalism-based objections are not present. Yet, governments 
do try to influence people’s behavior by making use of their cognitive limitations or self-control 
problems, and this is of course something that one can have different opinions about and that 
deserves further discussion and empirical analysis.   
 
Conclusions  
Green nudges are a new addition to the policy maker’s toolkit. We have seen an increase in 
studies on the use of behavioral interventions to correct for externalities. The rationale for using 
green nudges makes comparison with traditional policy instruments such as Pigovian taxes 
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relevant. For example, we show theoretically that in the case where an optimal tax is feasible 
and available, the role of nudging is often limited due to higher administrative costs. However, 
distributional concerns, the possibility of targeting and crowding-out might make them 
worthwhile even if this is the case. In the case of a non-existing or non-optimal tax, a nudge 
becomes more viable.  
As nudges are by definition context dependent, it is challenging to create general 
recommendation regarding the use of green nudges. Whether a green nudge or any other policy 
instruments such as taxes are the most appropriate instrument must be determined on a case-
by-case basis. The arguments in this paper are intended to provide a basis on which such 
evaluations can be made.  
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